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INJUNCTIONS AND REMOVAL UNDER SECTION 301(a)
OF TAFT-HARTLEY
Under the Wagner Act,1 the federal courts could hear cases or con-
troversies arising from a labor dispute only when the National Labor
Relations Board petitioned for enforcement of an order or when a
party appealed a Board decision. In 1947 Congress enacted the Taft-
Hartley Act,2 under which the federal district courts were given juris-
diction over controversies arising out of contract violations.3 As a result
of this Act, two forums are available to hear suits under Section 361 for
violation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, aside from
a proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board: the state
courts and the federal district courts. Employers have favored the
state courts, while unions, fearing unfavorable state court action, have
sought to remove the cases to the federal courts. These removal situa-
tions arise because of the availability of injunctive relief in the state
courts. Removing a case to a federal court also presents a problem,
as different courts have different standards for determining removal.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recent-
ly considered a case dealing with a state court injunction in a Section
301 suit and the subsequent removal of the case to the district court.
The case was American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs,4 and the controversy arose when the de-
fendant struck in violation of a "no-strike" clause in the union's con-
tract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued in a Pennsylvania state court
to obtain an injunction "and such other relief as the Court may deem
appropriate." The injunction was granted, and three days later the
defendant removed the case to the United States Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. District Judge Kraft held that the plaintiff
was an employer under Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, that
1National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (935), 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1958).
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 156 1947), 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1958).
'Section 3o1(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that "suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in
any industry affecting commerce. .. may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." By this section, a
federal forum was provided for the litigants. Id. at § 185.
'338 F.2d 837 (3 d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 88o US. 935 (965), reversing 224 F.
Supp. 985 (E.D. Pa. 1964). This case has also been commented on in 78 Harv. L. Rev.
1665 (1965).
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the defendant represented employees engaged in interstate commerce,
and that the district court would have had original jurisdiction over
the case. The court dismissed the case on the pleadings and not on the
merits. The plaintiff appealed from the district court's refusal to re-
mand the case to the state court.
In its motion to remand, the plaintiff had amended its original
complaint, asking only for injunctive relief. Holding the case had
been improperly removed, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
with one judge dissenting, remanded to the state court. The majority
held that the district court did not have jurisdiction, since it did not
have "power to entertain the suit, consider the merits and render a
binding decision thereon." Furthermore, the majority concluded that
the plaintiff's complaint was not based upon a federal right and thus
was not properly removed to the district court.
In his dissent, Judge Hastie contended that the state could grant
relief only if it were compatible with federal labor policy. In his
opinion, this policy includes the denial of injunctive relief in labor
disputes, and so the state court should have dismissed the suit. He also
believed that the complaint did rely upon a federal right, so that the
district court would have had original jurisdiction, and thus the case
was properly removed to the federal court.
In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,5 the Supreme Court decided
that Section 3o(a) was not intended to and did not confer exclusive
jurisdiction on the federal courts, thereby recognizing that the state
courts are also appropriate forums in which to bring a Section 3o
suit.6 Soon after deciding the Dowd case, the Supreme Court in Sin-
1368 U.S. 502 (1962), affirming 341 Mass. 337, 169 N.E.2d 885 (196o). The Court
noted at 5o6 that the Taft-Hartley Act "provides that suits of the kind described
Imay' be brought in the federal courts, not that they must be." The majority
also stated on the same page that "the statute does not state nor even suggest that
such jurisdiction shall be exclusive." The Supreme Court decision is discussed in
Comment, 2o Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 138 (1963).6Several state courts have exercised jurisdiction since adoption of § 301(a):
Connecticut Co. v. Division 425, Street Employees, 147 Conn. 6o8, 164 A.2d 413
(196o); Local 774, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 186 Kan. 569, 352
P.2d 420 (1g6o); Harbinson-Walker Refractories v. Local 702, Brick Workers, 339
S.W.2d 93 (Ky. 196o); Miller v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 332 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.
Ct. App. 196o); Anchor Motor Freight Corp. v. Local 445, Teamsters Union,
5 App. Div. 2d 869, 171 N.Y.S.2d 5o6 (1958); Steinberg v. Mendel Rosenzweig Fine
Furs, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 611, 167 N.Y.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1957); General Elec. Co. v.
United Auto Workers, 93 Ohio App. 139, io8 N.E.2d 211 (1952); Local 8, Long-
shoremen's Union v. Harvey Aluminum Corp., 226 Ore. 94, 359 P.2d 112 (1961);
Springer v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 220 Ore. 102, 348 P.2d 1112 (196o); Clark
v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (196o).
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clair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,7 considered the effect of Section 30(a) on
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and held that Section 30(a)
was not intended to render inapplicable the anti-injunction section of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.8 Read together, Section 3O (a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act and Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act mean that a
suit arising from the breach of a collective bargaining agreement may
be brought in a federal court, but that the federal court cannot give
injunctive relief. Thus, the holding in the Sinclair case eliminated
federal court injunctions.
Since federal-state jurisdiction is concurrent in Section 301(a)
cases and since the federal courts cannot grant injunctive relief, the
problem arises as to the type of relief the state court may grant under
Section 3o1(a). The leading case on this problem is McCarroll v. Los
Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters,9 wherein a union con-
tract provided that the plaintiff was to have freedom in hiring workers,
after first requesting men from the union hiring hall. Differences
arose from this clause and the union called a strike. The plaintiff
sought an injunction to terminate this strike. In affirming the grant-
ing of the injunction, Judge Traynor, speaking for the majority of
the Supreme Court of California, held a state court could grant any ap-
propriate relief under Section 30(a), and that Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act did not apply to state courts but only to United States
federal courts. The state court, therefore, could issue an injunction
in a case in which a federal court would be unable to grant the in-
junctive relief desired. Another case supporting state court action
recognizes that "state courts retain the jurisdiction they have always
had to enforce contracts notwithstanding Section 3Ol of the Labor
Management Relations Act....-10 These and similar decisions hold
that state courts may apply Section 301(a) free from the Norris-La-
Guardia Act restrictions placed upon federal courts.
Some federal courts have remanded labor cases to state courts to en-
able the granting of injunctions. In Associated Tel. Co. v. Communi-
7370 U.S. 195 (1962). This case involved a strike by a union in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement. By a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court decided
that the federal court was powerless to grant injunctive relief.
'47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act states that "no court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving
or growing out of any labor dispute...." Sinclair, supra note 7, held that the federal
courts could hear the case under § 3o1(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, subject to the
above restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
049 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
"0 Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. Local 1291, Longshoremen's Union, 382
Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733, 737 (1955).
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cation Workers,1 an injunction was granted by a state court to en-
join a strike in violation of a "no-strike" clause of the contract. The
case was removed to the district court which concluded that a fed-
eral right was relied upon by the plaintiff, the case was improperly
before it, and should be remanded to the state court. In remanding
the case, the court said that Congress did not intend to give the district
courts jurisdiction which would not serve a useful purpose. Thus, the
state court could apply Section 3o1(a) without regard to the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.
12
In the American Dredging Co. case, Judge Hastie contended that
the state and federal courts should apply the same federal labor law.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 3 the collective bargain-
ing agreement contained a clause for arbitration of grievances. Griev-
ances arose, but the employer refused to submit them to arbitration.
The union sued to compel specific performance of the contract. The
suit arose under Section 3o1(a) and the Supreme Court interpreted
that Section to mean that the federal courts were authorized to fashion
a body of labor law out of the policy of prohibiting federal injunctions
against strikes. By the Lincoln Mills decision, the Court indicated
the labor problem was national in scope, demanding that case law
conform with national labor policies.
In light of Lincoln Mills, a strong argument has been made that
state courts cannot issue injunctions in labor disputes, because, to do
so, would frustrate national labor policy.' 4 Federal labor laws, recog-
nizing the value of strikes to unions, permit such strikes and prohibit
federal courts from enjoining them. If a state court is allowed to en-
join a strike which a federal court could not enjoin, then such action
would frustrate present labor policies.'5 The Supreme Court has not
1114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
"Another case so holding is Castle & Cooke Terminals Ltd. v. Local 137, Long-
shoremen's Union, iio F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953). This case was decided before
Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, supra note 11, but advanced the
same proposition: a federal or state court could apply § 3o1(a) free from the
restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Obviously these cases have been overruled
by the Sinclair case, supra note 7, in regard to the application of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to federal courts. These cases, however, should still be valid precedent
for the proposition that the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act do not apply
to state courts.
13353 U.S. 448 (1957). "We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits
under § go(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws." Id. at 456.
"'Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
15Judge Carter, dissenting in the McCarroll case, supra note 9, did not feel
that a state court administering federal law could give relief unavailable in a federal
court. He contended that the federal anti-injunction policy should govern state
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passed on this point, but the McCarroll case 16 and the majority in the
American Dredging Co. case have taken the opposite view, holding
that a state court may issue injunctions in labor disputes.
With the law as it now is, the problem arises as to the standards to
be applied by federal courts in determining which cases may properly
be removed from the state courts. The Federal Removal Act provides,
in part, that "Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitu-
tion, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without
regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties."' 7 It is settled
law that, under this statute, the federal court must have had original
jurisdiction in order to entertain a removal action.' s Some courts
interpret the word "jurisdiction" to mean that the court must have
been able to grant the requested relief, if warranted. This means that
the federal court must have been able to make a final decree on the
merits.") Under this view, if the plaintiff only asks for an injunction,
the federal courts do not have original jurisdiction over the case, since
they would be unable to grant injunctive relief and would be forced
to dismiss the complaint.
Another approach, leading to the same conclusion, is that, for a
case or controversy to arise under the laws of the United States, the
federal right relied upon must be plainly stated on the face of the com-
courts applying § 301(a). He did not believe that § 301(a) could or should be ap-
plied in a case without applying the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
at the same time.
On the other side of this argument it could be said that had the framers of
the Taft-Hartley Act wished to bind the state courts they could have done so.
They could have required that any state court applying § 3o1(a) apply it in the
same manner as would a federal court, subject to the same restrictions.
lThe Supreme Court denied certiorari in the McCarroll case, 355 US. 932
(1958). Although the Court has frequently said that its denial of certiorari is not to
mean that the Court agrees with the decision, such a denial does mean that the
case is still good law. Perhaps the Court is just waiting to see the kind of case law
which will evolve from the courts, or perhaps it does agree with cases like Mc-
Carroll. In any event, until it acts it must be assumed that McCarroll represents
the prevailing view on state court actions under § 301(a).
"Removal Act, 62 Stat. 938 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958).
'Boone v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 163 F.2d 8o9 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Fulker-
son v. American Chain & Cable Co., 72 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Chicago &
N.W. Ry. v. Fachman, 125 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1963); Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa
296, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950); Board of County Comm'rs v. Black (Sivalls & Bryson,
Inc., 169 Kan. 225, 217 P.2d 1o7o (1950).
"Douglas v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Union, 136 F. Supp. 68 (W.D.
Mich. 1955) (dictum). "If, however, the relief prayed for in the complaint is limited
to specific performance of a no-strike clause, it seems that original jurisdiction
does not exist." Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 354, 367 (1958).
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plaint.20 Thus, the federal right relied upon must be discoverable from
the complaint and not from the answer or the petition for removal.
2 1
If the plaintiff has a choice of a federal or state right, the court must
look to his complaint to determine under which he wishes to proceed.
The underlying reason for this requirement appears to be the desire
of courts to allow the plaintiff to select his forum. Once the plain-
tiff has made his selection, the courts which adhere to this view are
reluctant to compel him to change, unless a federal question is clear-
ly presented.
A different approach would be to require only that the case be of
the class of cases which the court has jurisdiction to entertain.22 Such
an approach is represented by the decision of the Federal District
Court of Colorado in Swift 6 Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers.
23
The plaintiff and defendant had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement which included a "no-strike" clause. The defendant,
breached the contract clause and the plaintiff filed suit in a state
court to enjoin the strike. The court held that removal by the de-
fendant was appropriate, since the complaint set forth a cause of action
which the plaintiff could have brought in a federal district court.
Courts interpreting "jurisdiction" in this manner and allowing re-
moval contend that a case is removable even though the necessary con-
sequence of removal is a dismissal of the complaint.24 Contending
otherwise would be interpreting the Taft-Hartley Act as tolerating
remand to the state court to enable it to grant an injunction which
the federal court could not grant.23
2A1abama ex rel. Flowers v. Robinson, 22o F. Supp. 293 ( (N.D. Ala. 1963); Peter
Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry., 199 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1961); Collins v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Sandsberry v. Gulf C.
& S.F. Ry., 114 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Tex. 1953); Old Reading Brewery, Inc. v. Lebanon
Valley Brewing Co., io2 F. Supp. 434 (M.D. Pa. 1952); Adams v. Long, 65 F. Supp.
31o (W.D. Mo. 1943).
"tRomick v. Berkins Van & Storage, Inc., 197 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1952); Stouffer
v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9 th Cir. 195o); Olsen v. Doerfler, 225 F. Supp. 540 (E.D.
Mich. 1963); Marsden v. Southern Flight Serv., Inc., 192 F. Supp. 418 (M.D.N.C.
ig6i); Bill v. Carr, 88 F. Supp. 578 (D. Conn. 1949).
reUnited States v. New York & O.S.S. Co., 216 Fed. 61 (2d Cir. 1914); United
States v. Association of Am. R.R., 4 F.R.D. 51o (D. Neb. 1945); Scott v. Southeastern
Greyhound Lines, 5 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ohio 1945).
S177 F. Supp 5l (D. Colo. 1959).
2 Tri-Boro Bagel, Inc. v. Bakery Drivers Union, 228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y.
1963). This case involved a complaint asking for injunctive relief as did the com-
plaint in American Dredging Co. The court held that the case had been removed
properly and that it had jurisdiction, even though it would have to dismiss the
case, since it was unable to grant injunctive relief.
zCrestwood Dairy, Inc. v. Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). In denying
remand to the state court from which the case had come, the court said: "The
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Courts supporting removal to the federal system contend the com-
plaint need not specifically state on its face that the plaintiff is re-
lying upon a federal right. They hold that, if the complaint actual-
ly invokes federal law, the plaintiff cannot word his complaint to avoid
a federal forum.2 6 Although presumably no longer good law in light of
the holding in American Dredging Co., such avoidance of a federal
forum was attempted in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Coun-
cil No. 1.,27 a district court decision from the Third Circuit. This case
also involved a violation by the union of a "no-strike" clause in its
contract with the plaintiff. An injunction was granted by a Pennsyl-
vania state court, and the defendant removed the case to the United
States Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In denying the
plaintiff's motion for remand, the court said its jurisdiction "does not
depend upon the ingenuity of the form of a complaint in equity. -" 2 8
Proponents of labor injunctions contend that the plaintiff has the
right to choose his forum. In reply to this contention, it would seem
that the defendant should be allowed to have his federal rights en-
forced in a federal court. If the plaintiff is to select the forum, it seems
unfair to force the defendant to waive his right to a federal forum
merely because of the wording of the complaint.2 9 If the basic right
asserted is one based on federal law, the defendant should have the
benefit of the federal forum.30 The suggestion that plaintiff should
be permitted to compel defendant to litigate a federal claim in a state
court when Congress has explicitly made available a federal forum is
indefensible."
31
'jurisdictional' form of the prohibitions of that Act upon granting injunctions
are not to be interpreted as tolerating remand to the state court for the purpose
of enabling it to grant the injunctions that the Norris-LaGuardia Act would pre-
clude a federal court from granting...." Id. at 617.
"lAdams v. California, 176 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (holding that it was the
real nature of the claim and not the characterization given it by the plaintiff which
must determine jurisdiction). Accord: Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Congress of Racial Equal-
ity, 221 F. Supp. 541 (D.Md. 1963). These cases do not deal with labor disputes but
are cited as examples for the proposition that the true nature of the complaint is
controlling and not the appearance given it by the plaintiff.
" 229 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964). At the time of the decision in the American
Dredging Co. case, the court pointed out that two district judges in Pennsylvania
supported removal to the federal courts while three opposed it. Food Fair Stores,
supra, was not cited for support, but only as an example of an attempt to avoid
a federal forum by the wording of the complaint.
-Id. at 127.
2Pocohontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. Trade Council, 93 F. Supp. 217
(D. Me. 195o ).
IProduce Terminal Realty Corp. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 116 F. Supp.
451 (D. Mass. 1953) (denying remand and holding that the right was a federal right
which the defendant could enforce in a federal court).
"Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
